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An emerging view posits a timescale-based cortical topography, with integration windows increasing from
sensory to association areas. In this issue, Chaudhuri et al. (2015) present a cortical model wherein a hierar-
chy of timescales arises from local and inter-regional circuit dynamics.In real life, the brain needs to concurrently
accumulate and integrate information
over multiple timescales. For example,
when two monkeys from different families
start to fight, other monkeys from each
family track the fight: they observe the
facial expressions and body positioning
of the fighters as they circle (milliseconds
scale), they track the movements of the
fighters as they battle (seconds scale),
and they avoid interactions with the
opposing family until the fight (which can
last for many minutes) resolves (Cheney
and Seyfarth, 1999). Only a system with
the ability to allow past information to
exert an influence on current processing
over multiple timescales, in parallel, could
accomplish such a feat.
An analog for this problem ofmulti scale
temporal processing exists in the spatial
domain, and its solution in the brain is bet-
ter understood. In visual cortex, neurons
in early areas that code for basic features
such as edges and contrast have small
spatial receptive fields, i.e., a small region
of visual space over which the appro-
priate stimulus will elicit a response. As
one moves downstream to the areas that
receive and compile input from earlier vi-
sual areas, neurons have increasingly
large spatial receptive fields (Hubel and
Wiesel, 1962), enabling them to exhibit
properties such as size and location
invariance. Thus, the problem of concur-
rent processing of information at multiple
spatial scales is addressed by a hierarchi-
cal organization of increasing receptive
field sizes that mirrors the flow of informa-
tion from early regions to later regions.
Studies of neural dynamics in humans
and non-human primates have begun to
reveal a distributed, hierarchical organi-244 Neuron 88, October 21, 2015 ª2015 Elsezation of ‘‘temporal receptive windows’’
in the cortex, a temporal counterpart of
the spatial hierarchy. Converging results
from human imaging (Hasson et al.,
2008), human electrocorticography (Hon-
ey et al., 2012), and monkey single-unit
recordings (Murray et al., 2014) show
that processing timescales range from
the milliseconds range in early visual
and auditory cortex, up to the seconds
range in intermediate areas, and up to
minutes or longer in high-level associa-
tion areas such as posterior medial,
lateral tempoparietal, and prefrontal cor-
tex. Processing timescales have been
measured by (1) observing activity decay
rates following briefly presented stimuli,
(2) computing autocorrelation properties
of both stimulus-driven and spontaneous
(during rest) activity, and (3) examining
the durations at which changes to past
input can affect responses to dynamic
stimuli in the present moment. This
distributed organization has been pro-
posed to enable concurrent integration
over multiple timescales, as critically
needed for processing real-life contin-
uous stimuli (Hasson et al., 2015).
To explore what neurobiological circuit
mechanisms might support such a hier-
archy of timescales, Chaudhuri et al.
(2015) constructed a large-scale dynam-
ical model based on findings from an
anatomical analysis of connectivity in
the macaque neocortex (Markov et al.,
2014). In the model, each cortical area
is described by a threshold-linear, excit-
atory-inhibitory recurrent network. A key
feature of the model is the implementa-
tion of anatomical heterogeneity across
the cortex: inspired by studies showing
that the number of basal dendritic spinesvier Inc.on layer 3 pyramidal neurons increases
from early to late cortical areas (Elston,
2000), the authors varied the density
of excitatory connection strengths in
each cortical area according to the
position of that area in the cortical hierar-
chy. Their hypothesis was that this inter-
regional variation in the level of recurrent
excitation could give rise to a hierarchy of
different timescales across the cortex.
To examine the model’s response to
stimulus input, the authors simulated
pulsed input to primary visual cortex.
They observed propagation of responses
across areas, and notably they found
that decay times increased progressively
along the cortical hierarchy. Similarly,
when the authors simulated white-noise
input, they saw in early sensory areas
that temporal autocorrelation decayed
rapidly (at the scale of a few hundred mil-
liseconds), while in later areas autocorre-
lation persisted for much longer (at the
scale of a few seconds). Time constants
that were fit to the decay of each
area’s autocorrelation function generally
increased along the cortical hierarchy.
Interestingly, there were exceptions;
e.g., area 8m, part of the frontal eye fields,
expressed a long timescale despite being
relatively low in the cortical hierarchy
(matching empirical observations from
human brain imaging), seemingly due to
its connections with long-timescale pre-
frontal areas. When primary somatosen-
sory cortex was stimulated, responses
propagated along a separate network of
areas from the visual group, again with
hierarchically increasing timescales.
Does the variation in processing time-
scales across regions arise from region-
specific local circuit properties, or from
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macroarchitecture, or from a combination
of the two properties? To test this, Chaud-
huri et al. examined the effects of abolish-
ing the inter-area structure of local micro-
circuitry, or inter-areal projections, and of
both together. When differences in local
microcircuitry (i.e., the gradient of excit-
atory input strength across areas) were
removed, time constants decreased and
the relationship between regional time-
scale versus hierarchical level was elimi-
nated. When the empirical architecture
of long-range projections was removed,
regional timescales were moderately
reduced overall, and each area’s time-
scale strictly reflected its position in the
hierarchy.
Finally, the authors explored the conse-
quences of local microcircuit heterogene-
ity for functional connectivity in themodel.
When local heterogeneity was removed,
the correlation between functional con-
nectivity and anatomical connectivity
was drastically reduced. Empirical
studies of the primate brain show that
functional connectivity and anatomical
connectivity are related, but not strongly
so. The current finding offers a possible
explanation: resting state functional con-
nectivity is typically calculated under the
assumption of homogeneity across
areas. Thus, the correspondence of gross
functional and anatomical connectivity
might be better understood by account-
ing for local circuit properties that vary in
a regular manner along the macro-scale
anatomical hierarchy. Additionally, the
authors found that areas with long time-
scales were especially important for func-
tional connectivity in themodel: the longer
an area’s timescale, the greater the
impact on global activity patterns when
the area was lesioned.
Chaudhuri et al. have insightfully
demonstrated how anatomical connectiv-
ity—both within and between regions—
can produce a hierarchy of timescales in
neuronal population activity. There are a
number of other mechanisms that will be
important to consider in future work. First,
it will be important to consider variations
in processing timescales that may arise
from changes in the local biophysical
properties of neurons across the cortical
hierarchy: for example, the density of
‘‘fast’’ and ‘‘slow’’ glutamate receptors
(Wong and Wang, 2006) as well as thedensity of presynaptic calcium channels
and other regulators of synaptic depres-
sion and facilitation (Zucker and Regehr,
2002). Second, ascending neuromodula-
tory systems will directly regulate the
persistence of neuronal population activ-
ity, and this effect may apply to varying
extents as a function of the diffuse projec-
tions targeting higher and lower levels of
the cortical hierarchy. Finally, cortical pro-
cesses can achieve very long timescales
via interactions with the medial temporal
lobe, which supports direct reinstatement
of prior neuronal states. The recurrent
mechanisms in the model of Chaudhuri
et al. produce timescales up to the order
of seconds, but it will be important for
future work to determine how some cir-
cuits appear to integrate information
over minutes of time, and whether hippo-
campal interactions are a necessary
component of this process.
When we refer to the ‘‘integration’’ of
information over time, we mean, broadly,
the modification of an input signal in light
of past states of a circuit. The model of
Chaudhuri et al. instantiates the influence
of past stimuli on current responses by
slowing the decay of activity in higher
levels of the hierarchy and is thus closer
to a more specific mathematical sense
of integration. The persistent activity
state observed in higher-level areas re-
flects accumulation of inputs over time
and has been theorized to support cogni-
tive processes such as working memory
and decision-making. While this simple
mathematical notion of input accumula-
tion fits well with a buildup of evidence
prior to a decision, it is important to
question whether the ability to accumu-
late information over time is generally
sufficient for supporting functions that
require the combination of prior and pre-
sent information. Past and present input
may have a more complex relationship,
above and beyond simple summation:
for example, the meaning of—and neural
responses to—the words ‘‘she carefully
closed all of the windows’’ will change
if they are preceded by the words
‘‘When Frieda left her apartment for
vacation’’ versus ‘‘When Frieda logged
onto her friend’s laptop.’’ It seems that
a circuit would need abilities beyond
signal summation to differentiate these
cases; some manner of experience-
based expectation is at play, enablingNeuron 88past input (‘‘apartment’’ versus ‘‘laptop’’)
to rapidly influence the meaning of, and
neural responses to, stimuli a few sec-
onds later (‘‘windows’’). Observations
like these—which indicate that active
traces of past information within each
local circuit modify online processing—
encourage the development of a new
family of biophysical circuit models that
will allow for complex mixing of recent
memory with continuous input (Hasson
et al., 2015).
Despite the empirical observations of
slower processing in higher-order sys-
tems as noted above, we should not
forget that slow processes unfold in sen-
sory circuits (Yaron et al., 2012), and
higher-order systems may respond very
quickly (Kirchner et al., 2009). More
generally, for a system as complex as
a neuronal circuit, it can be overly reduc-
tionist to assign a single timescale of
activity (Marom, 2010). It is important,
therefore, to conceive of processing
timescales as a bias of activity within a
system that can operate on multiple
scales, rather than a prescription of
activity at a single scale. The flexibility
of processing timescales has an analog
in the spatial domain: neurons will often
exhibit some level of response outside
the immediate range of their spatial
receptive fields, which is dependent on
task, context, and attention demands
(Op De Beeck and Vogels, 2000). Just
as spatial receptive fields have been a
powerful construct for visual research,
temporal receptive windows may serve
as a useful organizing principle for old
and new discoveries in the dynamics of
cortical processing.REFERENCES
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